（2015-03-24 多维新闻）
中国大陆正在秘密进行颠覆台湾活动？美国媒体认为，以促进两岸文化交流的一大批非政府组织及其下属公司的活动十分可疑。
美国《国家利益》网站3月23日发表题为《不可阻挡：中国颠覆台湾的秘密计划》（Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan）的评论文章称，中国大陆正在借一系列非政府组织名义试图对台湾发起非军事的“政治战争”，意在不动用武力地“重新统一”台湾，事实上这一切的背后是解放军总政治部联络部，而台湾对此几乎全无防御能力。
毛泽东曾经说过，有百分之七十的战争是政治性的。毫无疑问，近期没有哪一次冲突比中国大陆试图“重新统一”台湾更忠实地遵守了这个说法。当分析家们更多地聚焦于实力越来越强盛的中国人民解放军对台湾这样一个民主岛国所构成的威胁的时候，北京的“重新统一”战略中的政治战争的因素实际上被忽略了。这或许是因为，海峡两岸关于茶叶和文化的座谈会远没有最先进的携弹战舰或者战斗机那么吸引眼球。
考虑到北京对于“非运动式的”打破僵局的方式的偏爱（战争代价高昂而且不可预测），很容易理解大陆领导人会避免与台湾开战，而是会探索其他方式。同时以台湾和台湾的国际支持者为目标而发动的政治战争（或者说“三战”）是更好的工具。自2008年以来，台湾与大陆的互动越来越多，两岸旅游人数快速增加，学术交流与投资机会也大幅增长，因此，中国大陆能够进行政治战争的机会也呈几何级数增长。
文化和艺术是大陆发动的针对台湾的政治战争的核心。但不要被气氛轻松的会议大厅、喜气洋洋的大学生之类表象所提供的无害外观所迷惑，这一切的背后是解放军总政治部联络部，“一个环环相扣的部门，在政治、金融、军事行动和情报的节点上进行运作。”
尽管解放军总政治部联络部的职权范围远远超出台湾之外，但其资源的很大一部分仍然投入了“台湾问题”的解决当中，以北京所喜欢的方式。
台湾的未来命运近期再次成为热点话题
中国大陆参与了对台政治战争或者为其提供了掩护的部门显然非常之多，然而，近年来仍有一个组织表现非常突出，这就是中华能源基金委员会，一个在香港注册的非政府组织，在它的自我定位里，它将自己说成是一个智库机构。中华能源基金委员会与全球多家机构与政府具有“合作关系”，其中包括大量中国高校、汉办、石油公司、兰德公司、加拿大国王议会办公室，还有联合国经济与社会委员会。
中华能源基金委员会的董事会主席叶简明同时也是中国华信的创始人之一，它是中华能源基金委员会的一个分支机构。中国华信是一家坐拥数百亿美元的能源公司（2013年它上报了高达2090亿人民币的收入，折合约334亿美元），在世界各地设有多处办公室，其中也包括位于台北101大楼的第21层的一间。现年三十八岁的叶简明没有更多消息披露，我们只知道他在2003至2005年曾担任与解放军总政治部联络部有联系的中国国际友好联络会的副秘书长。根据记者楚博（Andrew Chubb）和刚纳特（John Garnaut）的说法，叶简明可能与解放军总政治部联络部前主任叶选宁有关，或者也有可能是与中国前海军司令员叶飞上将有关。
中华能源基金委员会的分支机构当中特别值得注意的还有中国文化院。它注册于2012年，同样注册于香港。这是一个负责“推广中华文化”的受到国家支持的组织，自其创始起，中国文化院就在大陆和台湾两地举办了一系列跨海峡文化交流活动，参与其中的有来自两岸的学生、学者、娱乐界人士和宗教界人士。
在台湾方面，亲北京的中国时报集团和赞成统一的佛光山文教基金会对这些活动提供了赞助，例如2015年1月在台南举办的“高校学生文化体验营”，二者就担任了合作赞助商角色。根据福布斯杂志的统计，中国时报集团主席蔡衍明为台湾首富，有80亿美元资产。
其他活动，比如2014年10月在福建省福州市举办的“促进文化整合增进文化认同”沙龙，则是由中华能源基金委员会和中国华艺广播公司共同出资，后者1991年被解放军总政治部收编。而具体执行人员则更加耐人寻味，中国华艺广播公司的CEO王树（或汪澍）似乎同时也是解放军总政治部311基地的司令员。该基地由华信培训中心管理，华信培训中心则由福建华信控股有限公司注资，这是此前提到的中国华信能源公司的一个子公司。更复杂的是，福建华信控股有限公司的总经理兰华升同时也是中华能源基金委员会的副秘书长、中国文化院的执行主任、以及自2013年起两岸举办的一系列文化论坛当中的活跃分子。2014年10月，他参与的一个由中国文化院协办的论坛当中，他的演讲题目为“海峡两岸的四个区：共享同样的根，实现共同目标”。
位于福州的311基地被认为是“直接针对台湾进行心理操纵和宣传的前哨”。王树（或汪澍）也出席了上述论坛，论坛现场坐在他右边的是与中华能源基金委员会及孔子学院等机构均有联系的许嘉璐，他同时也是尼山世界文明论坛的主席。尼山世界文明论坛涵盖了多个解放军总政治部联络部旗下的组织，其中也包括中华能源基金委员会。许嘉璐还是中华文化发展促进会的主席，该组织在促进海峡“和平”和“重新统一”方面非常活跃。还有人认为，许嘉璐是中国大陆政治战争策略的总的设计师。
311基地（也被称为舆论战心理战法律战基地）的重要性不容低估。作为一个副团级机构，311基地大约发挥着六个常规导弹旅的作用，该基地还积极参与了网络战。
现在应当清楚了，中华能源基金委员会及其下属分支机构在联合了台湾方面的富有合作者以后，已经有了充足的财政资源去投入到针对台湾的政治战争当中去。它意在影响相关讨论，并抓紧一切可能招募个人。它的复杂性质使得情报部门很难区分它的政治战争行动和更多的“合法的”活动。但考虑到我们已知的中华能源基金委员会在财政金融上的操作，很难相信它设在台北的办公室没有参与政治战争活动。
中华能源基金委员会只是中国大陆用于发动类似活动的许多组织当中的一个，类似的活动在台湾、香港和全球其他地区都有分布。本文意在揭示中国是如何使用这种策略去欺骗和掩盖它的真实意图的，中华能源基金委员会可能被复制成百上千个，而抗击它们变成了一个几乎不可能的任务。(苏希
编译)
Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert
Taiwan
There is a convoluted network of companies
and organizations that could be involved in Beijing's "onion layer"
strategy.
(J. Michael Cole，National
Interrest, 2015-3-23)
Mao Zedong reportedly once said that
warfare is 70 percent political. Arguably, no conflict in recent times has
adhered to this concept more faithfully than China’s ongoing campaign to
“reunite” Taiwan with the “Mainland.” While analysts have tended to focus on
the threat which an increasingly powerful People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses
to the democratic island-nation, the political warfare component of Beijing’s
“reunification” strategy has received much less attention, perhaps because
cross-strait symposia on tea and culture are far less “newsworthy” than the
latest missile boat or combat aircraft.
Given Beijing’s preference for “nonkinetic”
solutions to the impasse (war would be costly and unpredictable), it makes
perfect sense that its leadership would explore alternative means by which to
win the war in the Taiwan Strait. Political warfare (or the “Three
Warfares,”
三战), targeting both Taiwan and its supporters in the international
community, is a favored instrument. There has been a growing number of
interactions between Taiwan and China since 2008. And what with rapidly
expanding cross-strait travel, academic exchanges and investment, the
opportunities for China to engage in political warfare have increased
exponentially.
Art and culture, benign as they may sound,
are at the heart of China’s political-warfare strategy against Taiwan. But
don’t be fooled by the innocuous façade provided by the cushy conference halls
and beaming university students: Behind all this lies the PLA’s General
Political Department Liaison Department (GPD/LD), “an interlocking directorate
that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence.”
Although the GPD/LD’s remit extends well
beyond Taiwan, a large share of its resources is nevertheless committed to
resolving the Taiwan “question” on terms that are favorable to Beijing.
The list of Chinese units that engage in or
provide cover for political warfare against Taiwan is admittedly a long one.
However, one organization that has gained prominence in recent years is the
China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC, 中华能源基金委员会), a Hong
Kong–registered nongovernmental organization that advertises itself as a
think tank (not to be confused with the French CEFC [7], where I am an
associate researcher). A subsidiary of the CEFC China Energy Co., Ltd [8]
(Huaxin, 中国华信), the CEFC claims to have “partnerships” [9] with several
organizations and government bodies worldwide, including a number of Chinese
universities, Hanban, oil companies, Rand Corp, the Privy Council’s Office of
Canada, and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The board chairman of the CEFC is Ye
Jianming (叶简明), who is also listed as a founder of the aforementioned Huaxin, a
multibillion-dollar energy logistics company (its reported income in 2013 stood
at 209 billion renminbi, or US$33.4 billion) with several offices worldwide,
including one on the twenty-first floor of the Taipei 101 skyscraper. Not much
is known about the thirty-eight-year-old Ye. We know that he was deputy
secretary general of the GPD/LD-linked China Association for International
Friendly Contacts (CAIFC) from 2003-2005. According to journalists Andrew Chubb
and John Garnaut , he may be related to Lt.-Gen. Ye Xuanning, GPD/LD director
until 1998, or to Admiral Ye Fei, the PLA Navy commander from 1980 to 1982.
One subsidiary of the CEFC that is of
particular interest is the China Institute of Culture Limited (CIOC, 中国文化院).
Registered in 2012 (also in Hong Kong), the CIOC is a nationally supported
organization in charge of “promoting Chinese culture.” Since its inception,
the CIOC has organized—in both China and Taiwan—a series of cross-strait
cultural events involving students, academics, entertainers and religious
figures from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
On the Taiwan side, the pro-Beijing Want
Want China Times Group and pro-unification Fo Guang Shan Foundation for
Buddhist Culture and Education (佛光山文教基金會) have sponsored events. Both, for example, were co-sponsors of the “University
Students’ Culture Experiencing Camp,” held in Kaohsiung,
southern Taiwan, in January 2015. According to Forbes magazine, Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明),
chairman of the Want Want China Times Group, is the richest man in Taiwan ,
with a fortune of US$8 billion.
Other events, such as the “Promoting
Cultural Integration and Increasing Cultural Identity” salon held
in Fuzhou, Fujian Province in October 2014, were co-organized by the CEFC and
China Huayi Broadcasting Corp (CHBC, 中国华艺广播公司), which was
incorporated by the GPD in 1991. And that’s where the
constellation of affiliated organizations and operatives gets really
interesting. The chief executive officer of CHBC, Wang Shu (汪澍/王树), also
happens to be commander of GPD 311 Base (61716 Unit). The Base is managed by
the Huaxin Training Center (华信培训中心), which itself is funded by the Fujian Huaxin (CEFC) Holding
Company, a subsidiary of the US$30 billion CEFC China Energy Co discussed
earlier. Confused yet? It gets even more complex. Lan Huasheng (兰华升), the general
manager of Fujian Huaxin Holding Company, is also CEFC deputy secretary
general, executive director of the CIOC, and an active participant at many of
the cultural forums held between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 2013.
His speech at a CIOC/CHBC forum in October 2014 was titled “Four Districts of
Cross-Straits: Sharing the Same Root, Achieving the Same Goal.”
According to Stokes and Hsiao, the
Fuzhou-based 311 Base is “[a]t the forefront of applied psychological
operations and propaganda directed against Taiwan.” Wang was present at the
aforementioned salon (he is fourth from left in the third picture in the hyperlink
above; the man to his right is Xu Jialu [许嘉璐], who is
associated with CAIFC, CEFC, Confucius Institutes, and president of the Nishan
Forum on World Civilizations (尼山世界文明论坛), which overlaps with several GPD/LD organizations, including CEFC.
Xu is also chairman of the China Association for the Promotion of Culture (CAPCC,
中华文化发展促进会), an organization that is actively involved in the promotion of a
cross-strait “peace accord” and “re-unification.” It is claimed that Xu “orchestrates” China’s
overall political-warfare strategy.
The significance of 311 Base (also known as
the Public Opinion, Psychological Operations, and Legal Warfare Base, 舆论战心理战法律战基地)
cannot be overstated. As a deputy-corps-level organization, 311 “carries
roughly as much status as all those six conventional missile brigades [from the
Second Artillery Corps’ Base 52] that target Taiwan combined,” Stokes wrote in
an e-mail response. The base is also actively involved in cyber operations.
It should be clear by now that the CEFC and
its affiliates, which are joining forces with extraordinarily rich partners in
Taiwan, have formidable financial resources at their disposal to engage in
political warfare in Taiwan, to shape the discourse and possibly to recruit
individuals. The convoluted nature of the network—where global energy firms
overlap with think tanks, foundations, the GPD/LD and intelligence
operatives—makes it extraordinarily difficult for intelligence agencies (and
the less security-aware targets) to distinguish between political warfare and
more “legitimate” activities. Given what we know about CEFC China Energy Co and
the many GPD/LD-related subsidiaries whose operations it finances, it is
difficult to imagine that its office in Taipei is not involved in political
warfare.
The CEFC is just one of the many Chinese
organizations that engage in such activities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and globally.
While it barely scratches the surface, this article demonstrates how China uses
an “onion layer” strategy to deceive and overwhelm its adversaries. Multiply
the CEFC phenomenon by ten, twenty, fifty, and the task of countering those
efforts becomes a nearly impossible one.
（J. Michael Cole, a former analyst at the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, is editor in chief of www.thinking-taiwan.com,
a senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of
Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on
Contemporary China (CEFC) in Taipei. He can be found on Twitter at
@JMichaelCole1.）
